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I.

Introduction

David Caron was a careful but also creative international lawyer, and his scholarly
attention turned toward not just international dispute resolution, but also the law of the sea.2
The focus of this chapter is on creativity in dispute resolution relating to the law of the sea.
When the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was adopted in 1982, its
dispute settlement procedures were heralded as highly creative in offering an array of
possibilities for States (and even non-State actors).3 Now that almost three decades have
passed since the Convention’s entry into force in 1994, can it be said that the promise of such
creativity has been fulfilled?
It appears that the answer to that question is largely yes, not just in the modes by which
dispute resolution is occurring (negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and judicial
settlement), but also in the wide-ranging issues being addressed within those modes, and
perhaps even in the express and tacit dialogue occurring among the dispute settlers. The
system, of course, is not perfect and could be more robust, but we may be amidst a “rising tide”
of maritime dispute resolution, one that is strengthening and developing this area of the law.
At the same time, a word of caution is in order; some aspects of the creativity found within the
decisions of dispute settlers may well be giving at least some States pause as to the procedures
they have unleashed.
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II.

1982 UNCLOS

As is well-known, UNCLOS seeks to regulate comprehensively virtually all aspects of the
beginning with rules on the existence of baselines along the coasts of States; a few rules
relating to internal waters that exist on the landward side of the baselines; then rules on the
seaward side of the baselines in the territorial sea,5 the contiguous zone,6 the exclusive
economic zone,7 the continental shelf,8 and finally the high seas.9 Islands are capable of
generating their own maritime zones, but much depends on, first, whether it is an “island,” and,
second, whether the island is a “rock” that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of
its own.10 Special rules address straits,11 archipelagos,12 enclosed or semi-enclosed seas,13 and
even land-locked States.14 Wide-ranging freedoms are acknowledged for all States on the high
seas, including of navigation, overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, construction
of artificial installations, fishing, and scientific research;15 many of these freedoms also operate
in the exclusive economic zone subject to the provisions of that zone.16 Warships benefit from
these rules and from some special rules, such as relating to their immunity.17
seas,4

UNCLOS also sets forth rules relating to exploitation of the deep seabed beyond national
jurisdiction and, in that regard, creates an international organization—the International Seabed
Authority—for decision-making and implementation, consisting principally of an Assembly (with
equal representation from States Parties), a Council (with regional and interest group

4

For general analysis of the contemporary law of the sea, see Jean-Paul Pancracio, Droit de la mer (Dalloz 2010);
James Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea: A Study in the Development of International Law (CUP 2011); Harry N
Scheiber and Jin-Hyun Paik (eds), Regions, Institutions, and the Law of the Sea: Studies in Ocean Governance
(Martinus Nijhoff 2013); David Freestone (ed), The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention at 30: Successes, Challenges,
and New Agendas (Brill 2013); Donald R Rothwell et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (OUP
2015); Donald R Rothwell & Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (2nd edn Hart 2016); Alexander Proelss
(ed), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary (Beck/Hart/Nomos 2017); Mathias Forteau
and Jean-Marc Thouvenin (eds), Traité de droit international de la mer (Pedone 2017); Myron H Nordquist et al.
(eds), Legal Order in the World’s Oceans: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Brill 2018); Yoshifumi Tanaka, The
International Law of the Sea (3rd edn CUP 2019); Philippe Vincent, Droit de la mer (2nd edn Larcier 2020); Robin
Churchill, Vaughan Lowe and Amy Sander, The Law of the Sea (4th edn Manchester 2022).
5
UNCLOS (n 3), pt. II, §§ 1-3.
6
Ibid., pt. II, § 4.
7
Ibid., pt. V.
8
Ibid., pt. VI.
9
Ibid., pt. VII.
10
Ibid., pt. VIII.
11
Ibid., pt. III.
12
Ibid., pt. IV.
13
Ibid., pt. IX.
14
Ibid., pt. X.
15
Ibid., art. 87.
16
Ibid., art. 58(1).
17
See ibid. arts. 29-33, 95, 102, 107, 110-11, 224, 236.

3

representation of States Parties), and a Secretariat.18 As is well-known, disagreement over the
original scheme for addressing the deep seabed resulted in a 1994 “implementing agreement”
that significantly revised the deep seabed provisions.19 Further, UNCLOS establishes important
rules for environmental protection of the seas, which are so extensive that they arguably
constitute an environmental treaty embedded within UNCLOS.20 In addition to discrete parts of
UNCLOS addressing marine scientific research21 and the transfer of marine technology,22 it sets
forth throughout important rules relating to jurisdiction over ocean vessels, which give primary
authority to the flag State, but recognize as well certain roles for coastal, port, and other States.
This brief tour d’horizon recalls the broad range and complexity of UNCLOS for the
purpose of stressing why dispute settlement was viewed during the negotiations as essential
for the Convention to succeed. Though the Convention is highly detailed, the drafters
understood that disputes would arise regarding its interpretation and application, and without
a means of resolving those disputes, the Convention might not succeed. A prime example in
this regard are the rules on delimitation of exclusive economic zones and of continental
shelves, which simply provide that such delimitation “shall be effected by agreement on the
basis of international law … in order to achieve an equitable solution.”23 If States cannot reach
such agreement “within a reasonable period of time,” they may resort to UNCLOS dispute
settlement procedures,24 but there is no further guidance in the Convention as to how to
resolve such disputes, thus inviting a degree of creativity.25
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Consequently, UNCLOS Part XV establishes an innovative system for the settlement of
disputes.26 Section 1 of Part XV obligates States to peacefully settle their disputes concerning
the interpretation or application of the Convention and, to that the end, to pursue any agreedupon method of dispute settlement or to consider pursuing conciliation in accordance with the
procedures set forth in Annex V. If no settlement is reached under Section 1 methods, then
Section 2 provides for compulsory dispute settlement before one of four possible venues: (1)
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), which is based in Hamburg; (2) the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is based in The Hague; (3) ad hoc arbitration in
accordance with UNCLOS Annex VII; or (4) a “special arbitral tribunal” constituted in accordance
with Annex VIII for certain categories of disputes. When ratifying or acceding to the
Convention, or at any time thereafter, a State may make a declaration choosing one or more of
these venues; in the absence of a declaration, the State is deemed to have accepted arbitration
under Annex VII. When a dispute arises, if the two States have chosen different venues and
cannot agree upon which one to use, then the default is to go to Annex VII arbitration.
While it was believed important to include compulsory jurisdiction in UNCLOS, it was
nevertheless viewed as necessary to establish certain automatic limitations and optional
exceptions to that jurisdiction, which are contained in Section 3 of Part XV. These carve-outs
can be quite important, such as an automatic limitation that precludes compulsory dispute
settlement concerning the coastal State’s determination of the allowable catch in the exclusive
economic zone.27 The optional exceptions, which may be invoked by a State when it joins
UNCLOS, include disputes concerning maritime boundary delimitation, historic bays or titles, or
military activities.28 If one of these carve-outs preclude legally binding dispute settlement, the
States nevertheless are obligated to pursue conciliation (a process sometimes referred to as
“compulsory conciliation”), though that process does not result in a legally binding decision.

26

See generally Natalie Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (CUP 2005);
Constantinos Yiallourides Maritime Disputes and International Law: Disputed Waters and Seabed Resources in Asia
and Europe (Routledge 2019); Joanna Mossop, “Dispute Settlement in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction,” in Vito
De De Lucia et al. (eds), International Law and Marine Areas beyond National Jurisdiction 392 (Brill 2022).
.
27
UNCLOS (n 3), art. 297(3)(a).
28
Ibid., art. 298. China, for example, has invoked all of these optional exceptions. See UN Treaty Collection,
“United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,”
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en> accessed 9 August 2022. On the potential for creative interpretation of
the Section 3 carve-outs, with a focus on the South China Sea arbitration, see Natalie Klein, “The Vicissitudes of
Dispute Settlement under the Law of the Sea Convention,” 32 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 332 (2017).
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As of 2022, 168 States have become parties to UNCLOS,29 and 151 of these States have
become party to the 1994 Implementing Agreement.30 Moreover, additional efforts to codify
the law of the sea have continued apace. Some further agreements are global in nature, such
as the agreement reached in 1995 to handle the vexing problem of fish that migrate between
or “straddle” areas under the jurisdiction of two or more States or the high seas.31 Other
agreements are regional in nature, sometimes targeting specific issues, such as management of
a particular species of fish.32 Some agreements tackle unusual issues, such as how to handle
ancient shipwrecks discovered on the floor of the ocean.33 Because UNCLOS States Parties are
committed to compulsory dispute resolution with respect to “any dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of an international agreement related to the purposes of this
Convention, which is submitted … in accordance with the agreement,”34 there are about a
dozen multilateral agreements and a few bilateral agreements in force that provide for
resolution of disputes arising under those agreements through UNCLOS procedures.35 Looking
to the future, efforts are underway to conclude an agreement on biodiversity beyond national
jurisdiction or “BBNJ.”36 Consequently, the law of the sea today is a complicated series of
global, regional, and even bilateral agreements,37 with a backdrop of well-established
customary rules,38 ensconced in a creative scheme for dispute settlement.
An important driver of many maritime disputes is the deep interest in exploitation of
ocean resources, be it fish, energy, oil, gas, or minerals. Such interest has only increased since
entry into force of UNCLOS in 1994, fueled in part by ever-increasing technologies that promote
cost-efficient exploitation. The initial excitement in the 1970s about deep seabed mining faded
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by the 1990s, largely due to a collapse in world metal prices, the development of synthetics in
place of some minerals, and the emergence of new sources in developing States. Even so,
interest in seabed mining in this century has reemerged; the International Seabed Authority, set
up under UNCLOS, has now approved numerous contracts with private entities for seabed
exploration.39 While not the only source of frictions among States, access to ocean resources
underlies many of the disputes in this area of the law, and likely will for some time.
III.

Negotiation

In light of the detailed rules available under the contemporary law of the sea, the
increasing desire to exploit natural resources from the various zones, and the possibility of
compulsory dispute settlement, it is perhaps of no surprise that States have been motivated, in
the first instance, to negotiate with each other to resolve their disputes.40 Identifying the
existence of such negotiations is not always easy; States will often engage in negotiations
quietly. Even so, various studies suggest that negotiations since the entry into force of UNCLOS
in 1994 have flourished. For example, Igor Karaman catalogues more than sixty negotiations
between States from 1994 to 2012; some of those negotiations succeeded, some have not, and
others remain ongoing.41
Negotiations that succeeded have resulted in a number of international agreements,
such as the 2004 Treaty between Australia and New Zealand establishing certain Exclusive
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Boundaries,42 the 2008 Agreement between Mauritius
and the Seychelles on the Delimitation of their Exclusive Economic Zones,43 and the 2009
Maritime Boundary Delimitation Treaty between Barbados and France concerning delimitation
between Barbados and France’s overseas departments of Guadeloupe and Martinique.44 In
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some instances, such agreements themselves provide for the possibility of dispute settlement
in the event that a disagreement arises with respect to interpretation or application of the
agreement.45
Creativity is clearly present in the process and substance of such negotiations. With
respect to process, UNCLOS is crafted so as not to preclude States from negotiating outcomes
inter se if there is political will to do so. Certainly, delimitation calls in the first instance for a
negotiated outcome,46 but even in other contexts, UNCLOS reflects an openness to the political
will of States, whether it be in sharing the allowable catch in the exclusive economic zone;47
determining the location of submarine cables or pipelines;48 sorting out historic rights in
archipelagic waters;49 or addressing navigational, safety, and environmental matters in straits.50
Even with respect to the resort to dispute settlement, the preference of the two States is
paramount, superseding any mandatory dispute settlement.51
With respect to the substance of such negotiations, creativity is observable from the
fact that States may negotiate outcomes that would not be possible if they left matters to a
dispute settler required to follow a strict application of international law. In the context of
maritime delimitation, for example, a dispute settler is typically limited to awarding sovereignty
or jurisdiction over maritime areas solely to one State or the other.52 Yet in a negotiated
settlement of overlapping claims to maritime resources, States are free to establish joint
development arrangements, whereby States largely set aside their legal claims (at least for the
time being) and focus instead on practical measures to secure their underlying objectives.53
Such an approach allows the States to maintain their respective claims regarding the boundary
but to proceed on a more functional basis for both managing and exploiting the resources, even

45

See Cissé Yacouba and Donald McRae, “The Legal Regime of Maritime Boundary Agreements,” in David A Colson
and Robert W Smith (eds), International Maritime Boundaries 3300-03 (5th edn Martinus Nijhoff 2005).
46
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52
Karaman (n 41) at 186-87 (quoting Shigeru Oda, “Dispute Settlement Prospects in the Law of the Sea,” in Shigeru
Oda (ed), Fifty Years of the Law of the Sea: Selected Writings of Shigeru Oda 869 (Kluwer 2003)).
53
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in situations where the full extent of those resources are not known.54 Dozens of joint
development zones now exist, scattered across every region of the world.55
It is clear that negotiation is, by far, the most preferred method of dispute settlement
under the law of the sea, with States turning to other forms of dispute settlement only when
negotiations stall. David Anderson—a former legal adviser to the U.K. Foreign and
Commonwealth Office and former ITLOS judge—notes that, when it comes to boundary
delimitation, there are certain inherent advantages for States in pursuing negotiation. He
writes that: “The parties retain control over a series of important issues, such as the precise
results of the negotiations and in particular the course of the boundary lines; the way in which
the line is defined; the terms and timing of the agreement; and its presentation to public
opinion.”56 Indeed, he opines that “litigation always carries risks for the parties.”57
IV.

Mediation

By contrast, resort by States to mediation or “good offices” has been far more modest,
apparently numbering less than a dozen since 1994.58 Examples certainly exist, such as the
Organization of America States’ effort to mediate the territorial and maritime dispute between
Belize and Guatemala,59 or the U.N. Secretary-General’s mediation of Equatorial Guinea and
Gabon’s maritime boundary dispute.60 Mediation allows for the same creativity as is possible
for negotiation; neither the mediator nor the disputing States are bound to solutions driven by
strict application of the law. Further, this approach need not end at an effort to mediate, as the
mediation might result in the States gaining sufficient confidence to pursue more formalized
dispute resolution. For example, France’s mediation of the Eritrea-Yemen maritime boundary

54

Even though not dictated by rules of international law, arguably such actions may have an influence on the
development of international law in this area. See David M Ong, “Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and
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2005).
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122-23 (reprinted in David Anderson, Modern Law of the Sea: Selected Essays 417 (Brill 2008)).
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59
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August 2022.
60
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dispute ultimately led the States to reach agreement on resolving the dispute through
arbitration.61
V.

Conciliation

Prior to UNCLOS, conciliation of a dispute relating to the law of the sea was relatively
rare, with the notable exception being the conciliation of the dispute between Iceland and
Norway in 1981 concerning the continental shelf between Iceland and the Norwegian island of
Jan Mayen.62 Even so, conciliation as a method of dispute settlement is featured in UNCLOS
Part XV, along with an annex devoted to its procedures.63 One creative aspect of this procedure
is the concept of “compulsory conciliation.” If one of the automatic limitations or optional
exceptions contained in Section 3 of Part XV precludes binding compulsory dispute settlement,
the States Parties nevertheless may be obligated to pursue conciliation under Annex V, Section
2.64 For example, if a State Party has exercised its right to opt out of binding compulsory
dispute settlement concerning maritime boundary disputes or historic bays or titles, the State
nevertheless is bound to accept submission to conciliation of any such dispute that arises after
entry into force of UNCLOS.65 Although compulsory conciliation does not result in a legally
binding decision, the States Parties are required to negotiate an agreement on the basis of the
commission’s report and, if agreement is not reached, “the parties shall, by mutual consent,
submit the question” to one of the Part XV, Section 2, compulsory dispute procedures.66 The
words “by mutual consent” suggest that a State may not be compelled to accept any particular
binding dispute settlement procedure, though it has been suggested that the word “shall”
introduces ambiguity in that regard, which might be tested through a unilateral application.67
Notwithstanding the emphasis of UNCLOS on conciliation, to date States still do not
seem attracted to this method; the only conciliation under the Convention has been between
Timor-Leste and Australia concerning their maritime boundary in the Timor Sea and associated
issues. Timor-Leste unilaterally initiated the process, leading to the constitution of a
61

Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of Proceedings (Territorial Sovereignty and the Scope of the
Dispute) (Eritrea v Yemen), 22 RIAA 209, para. 77 (1996).
62
Conciliation Commission on the Continental Shelf Area between Iceland and Jan Mayen, Report and
Recommendations, 20 ILM 797, 803 (1981); see Elliot L Richardson, “Jan Mayen in Perspective,” 82 AJIL 443(1988).
63
Part XV, Section 1, is designed to promote settlement of disputes without resort to litigation. The conciliation
procedure envisaged in Article 284 entails each party choosing two conciliators (of which one may be its national)
from a list established by UNCLOS parties. The four conciliators then select a fifth to serve as chairperson. After
considering the views of both parties, the panel is to issue a report in which it makes non-binding
recommendations. UNCLOS Annex V is devoted to conciliation procedures.
64
UNCLOS (n 3), Annex V, arts 11-14.
65
Ibid., art. 298(1)(a)(i).
66
Ibid., art. 298(1)(a)(ii).
67
See Robert Beckman, “UNCLOS Part XV and the South China Sea,” in S Jayakumar et al. (eds), The South China
Sea Disputes and the Law of the Sea 246 (Edward Elgar 2014).
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commission in 2016, which thereafter decided in favor of its competence. After several
sessions with the parties, the process led in 2018 to the adoption by the two parties of a Treaty
on Maritime Boundaries and to the Commission’s issuance of a final report and
recommendations.68
The best explanation for why conciliation is not attractive to States is probably that once
States have decided to give up control over a dispute and to allow for a relatively formal
decision by the third-party body, then States are inclined to go all the way by accepting that the
ultimate decision should be legally binding, which means selecting arbitration or judicial
settlement. Indeed, States may well prefer to lose an arbitration and use the fact of a legallybinding obligation to help tamp down political resistance at home, rather than to “lose” a
conciliation and have no obligation to comply with the outcome.
VI.

Arbitration

By contrast, arbitration of law of the sea disputes has proved to be popular since 1994,
typically through arbitral tribunals convened under UNCLOS Annex VII. As in all arbitration,
there is a fair amount of flexibility (if not creativity) in the procedures of the tribunal, and in
their interplay with judicial settlement of disputes.69 Generally, these tribunals consist of five
arbitrators, with each party appointing one arbitrator, and then agreeing upon the remaining
three (with the President of ITLOS serving as the appointing authority, if needed). The arbitral
tribunal decides upon its own procedures, unless the parties agree otherwise, and hence the
process can be more flexible than judicial settlement of disputes. As of 2022, fifteen Annex VII
cases have been pursued, all but one administered under the auspices of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration.70 Perhaps creativity is best seen in the wide range of ancillary issues that counsel
68

The documents, decisions, and treaty may be found at the website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
<https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/132/> accessed 9 August 2022.
69
On judicial settlement, see infra section VII.
70
Southern Bluefish Tuna (New Zealand v Japan, Australia v Japan), Award of 4 August 2000, 23 RIAA 1; MOX Plant
(Ireland v United Kingdom) (proceedings terminated); Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor
(Malaysia v Singapore), Award of 1 September 2005, 27 RIAA 133; Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and
the Continental Shelf between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (Barbados v Trinidad and
Tobago), Award of 11 April 2006, 27 RIAA 147; Guyana v Suriname, Award of 17 September 2007, 30 RIAA 1;
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v India), Award of 7 July 2014, 32 RIAA 1;
Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom), Award of 18 March 2015, 31 RIAA 359;
“ARA Libertad” (Argentina v Ghana) (proceedings terminated); South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v China),
Award of 12 July 2016, 33 RIAA 166; “Arctic Sunrise” (Netherlands v Russian Federation), Award of 10 July 2017, 32
RIAA 315; Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arbitration (Kingdom of Denmark in respect of the Faroe Islands v European
Union) (proceedings terminated); Duzgit Integrity Arbitration (Malta v São Tomé and Príncipe), Award of 18
December 2019; The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (Italy v India), Award of 21 May 2020; Dispute Concerning Coastal
State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukraine v the Russian Federation) , Award on
Preliminary Objections of 21 February 2020 (proceedings still pending); Dispute Concerning the Detention of
Ukrainian Naval Vessels and Servicemen (Ukraine v the Russian Federation), Award on Preliminary Objections of 27
June 2022, (proceedings still pending).
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have managed to place before these tribunals, which may well not have been anticipated when
UNCLOS was crafted (and hence the resolution of which may be disturbing to some States).
Issues of sovereignty. For example, UNCLOS is not designed to resolve issues of
sovereignty and, as such, Annex VII tribunals are not expected to determine whether a land
mass is part of the territory of one of the disputing parties. At the same time, it is commonly
said that the “land dominates the sea,” which means that a State’s rights and obligations in
areas of the sea often turn upon sovereignty over adjacent land masses. This issue arose in the
Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, after the United Kingdom, in April 2010, declared a
marine protected area at the Chagos Archipelago, which the United Kingdom administers as the
“British Indian Ocean Territory.” Mauritius disputes the United Kingdom’s sovereignty over this
territory, believing that the archipelago should have been included as part of the territory of
Mauritius when Mauritius emerged from the period of colonization and became an
independent State in 1968. Consequently, in 2010 Mauritius initiated a proceeding under
UNCLOS before an Annex VII arbitral tribunal. UNCLOS allows a “coastal State” to establish a
marine protected area adjacent to its coast, but one aspect of Mauritius’ claims was that the
United Kingdom was not the “coastal State” in respect of the Chagos Archipelago for the
purposes of the Convention. Alternatively, Mauritius claimed that certain undertakings by the
United Kingdom had endowed Mauritius with rights as a “coastal State” in respect of the
Archipelago.
The tribunal found in 2015 by a majority of three votes to two that it lacked jurisdiction
to consider either of these claims.71 According to the tribunal, such claims—at their core—
concerned the question of sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, not disagreements about
the meaning of “coastal State” or some other issue relating to the marine protected area.
Therefore, according to the tribunal, these claims were not truly a matter concerning the
interpretation or application of UNCLOS. The Tribunal, however, did not assert that the issue of
sovereignty could never be addressed in UNCLOS proceedings. Rather, the Tribunal said that it
did “not categorically exclude that in some instances a minor issue of territorial sovereignty
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could indeed be ancillary to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the
Convention.”72 Indeed, it suggested “that an issue of land sovereignty might be within the
jurisdiction of a Part XV court or tribunal if it were genuinely ancillary to a dispute over a
maritime boundary or a claim of historic title.”73
Undaunted, Mauritius thereafter successfully lobbied the UN General Assembly to seek
an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on whether the separation of the
Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius during the process of decolonization was unlawful.74 The
Court advised that it was, stating that, “having regard to international law, the process of
decolonization of Mauritius was not lawfully completed when that country acceded to
independence in 1968, following the separation of the Chagos Archipelago,” and that “the
United Kingdom is under an obligation to bring to an end its administration of the Chagos
Archipelago as rapidly as possible.”75 With these findings in hand, Mauritius launched an Annex
VII arbitration (thereafter placed before ITLOS) on maritime delimitation against the Maldives,
which is located to the north of the Chagos Archipelago. The Maldives argued that ITLOS (sitting
as a special chamber) lacked jurisdiction, since any delimitation between the Parties would
necessarily have to find that Mauritius was (and the United Kingdom was not) sovereign over
the Chagos Archipelago, a matter that the was in dispute.76 The Chamber, however, concluded
that the matter had been resolved by the ICJ’s advisory opinion, finding that “determinations
made by the ICJ in an advisory opinion cannot be disregarded simply because the advisory
opinion is not binding” and that “[w]hile the process of decolonization has yet to be completed,
Mauritius’ sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago can be inferred from the ICJ’s
determinations”.77
The issue of sovereignty also hovered in the background of perhaps the most famous of
the Annex VII arbitrations to date—that of the Philippines against China, which challenged
China’s claims to and activities in the South China Sea and the underlying seabed. China had
been asserting some kind of claim, perhaps to sovereignty or more likely to “historic rights” or
“historic title,” over a rather large area of the South China Sea lying within what is known as the
“nine-dash line,” a line that has appeared on maps produced by China. Further, China claimed
sovereignty over several islands or maritime features in the South China Sea. Given such
72
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claims, it was unclear whether an UNCLOS case might be brought against China, since
addressing issues of sovereignty is problematic. Even so, in 2013, the Philippines instituted
arbitral proceedings against China under Annex VII, artfully avoiding in its pleading any request
that the tribunal address issues of sovereignty. Rather, the Philippines focused on whether
certain maritime features were capable of being islands (if not, then no State could exercise
sovereignty over them); for maritime features that were islands, the Philippines focused on
resolving rights to maritime entitlements in the South China Sea even if one were to assume
Chinese sovereignty over those islands.
Framed in that way, and despite China’s decision not to participate in the case, the
tribunal found that it had jurisdiction78 and then issued a final award in 2016.79 Among other
things, the tribunal concluded that, while Chinese navigators and fishermen (and those of other
States) had historically made use of the islands in the South China Sea, there was no evidence
that China had exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources. Further, even if
China previously had historic rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, such
rights were extinguished to the extent that they were incompatible with the exclusive economic
zones provided by UNCLOS to the States surrounding the South China Sea. As such, there was
no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources of the sea areas within the “ninedash line.” The tribunal’s wide-ranging decision addresses a host of other issues as well;
particular attention has been paid to its interpretation of what is meant, in UNCLOS Article
121(3), by the phrase “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their
own.”80
Concerns with respect to sovereignty also arose in Coastal Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of
Azov and Kerch Strait.81 In that case, Ukraine filed an Annex VII arbitration against Russia
alleging that Russia had violated Ukraine’s rights as a coastal State, such as to the living and
hydrocarbon resources. Russia raised as a preliminary objection that the tribunal lacked
jurisdiction because the dispute in reality concerned Ukraine’s claim to sovereignty over the
Crimean peninsula. Ukraine responded by arguing that there was no sovereignty dispute since
Russia had acted unlawfully in seizing Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 and, alternatively, that even
if there was a sovereignty dispute, it was an ancillary matter.82 In an award on preliminary
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objections, the Tribunal unanimously upheld Russia’s objection “to the extent that a ruling of
the Arbitral Tribunal on the merits of Ukraine’s claims necessarily requires it to decide, directly
or implicitly, on the sovereignty of either Party over Crimea.”83 According to the Tribunal, the
dispute over sovereignty was not ancillary to the interpretation or application of UNCLOS;
whether Ukraine was a coastal State was a prerequisite to deciding a number of Ukraine’s
claims.84 This outcome was consistent with the Annex VII arbitral award in the Chagos case.
Issues on the use of force. A different ancillary issue that has arisen concerns the use of
force, and especially the difference between permissible maritime law enforcement and
impermissible violation of the U.N. Charter. For example, in Guyana v Suriname, an Annex VII
arbitral tribunal used UNCLOS Article 279 as a hook to address this issue; that article provides
that the parties shall settle any dispute between them under UNCLOS “by peaceful means.”85
Seeing that article as allowing it to apply the jus ad bellum of the U.N. Charter and general
international law, the tribunal found “that in international law force may be used in law
enforcement activities provided that such force is unavoidable, reasonable and necessary.”86 In
this instance, Suriname’s action of sending a patrol vessel to order an oil rig to leave the
contested waters did not meet such a standard and was thus determined to be an unlawful
threat of force. That determination turned on the circumstances of the particular incident: the
rig was approached at midnight and given twelve hours to leave; the rig was told if it didn’t
leave “the consequences will be yours”; and the men on the rig perceived that this meant
military force would be used if they did not leave.87
In the context of using force, the “military activities” exception to UNCLOS dispute
settlement may feature.88 If so, the case law to date is less creative than confusing. Given that
China had invoked the exception when adhering to UNCLOS, the South China Sea arbitral
tribunal found that it had no jurisdiction over a Philippines claim concerning Chinese nonmilitary vessels that had sought to prevent Philippine military vessels from resupplying its
military personnel stationed at Second Thomas Schoal.89 By contrast, the same tribunal found
that the exception did not apply to a Philippines claim concerning Chinese military vessels used
for land reclamation activities.90 In the Coastal Rights case, Russia was not able to invoke the
exception as a basis for excluding jurisdiction over Ukraine’s case concerning coastal rights
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relating to Crimea. Russia’s assertion that the dispute related to the 2014 Ukraine-Russia
conflict was deemed by the Annex VII arbitral tribunal as insufficient for triggering the
exception; to do so, the specific acts at issue in Ukraine’s complaints had to constitute military
activities.91 Further, simply alleging a use of force to deny access to resources was not enough;
among other things, the tribunal noted that maritime enforcement action and other “nonmilitary” functions may be exercised equally by military and non-military vessels.92
At the provisional measures phase of Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels, ITLOS
interpreted this exception when ordering Russia to release the Ukrainian naval vessels, as well
as their crew, that had been detained in or near the Kerch Strait on 25 November 2018.93
Although Russia had invoked the military activities exception when adhering to UNCLOS, ITLOS
found it prima facie was not applicable to a situation where Russian naval vessels forcibly seized
Ukrainian naval vessels and crew. According to ITLOS, the underlying dispute concerned the
legal status of the Kerch Strait, which was not military in nature.94 Moreover, the Ukrainian
naval vessels had abandoned their effort to pass through the strait when they were
nevertheless detained by Russia, which, according to ITLOS, cast the event as in the nature of a
law enforcement rather than a military operation.95 The lone dissenting judge regarded
navigational activities at sea of a State’s warships to be inherently “military” and regarded this
particular incident as involving military activities by both sides.96 The case then proceeded
before an Annex VII arbitral tribunal, which at the jurisdictional phase carved a path between
these two positions. On the one hand, the tribunal in found that that the events of 25
November 2018 were, up until a certain point in time, “military activities” excluded from the
tribunal’s jurisdiction; on the other hand, after that point in time, the arrest of the Ukrainian
naval vessels were more in the nature of a law enforcement operation falling within its
jurisdiction. The precise point in time when things changed was left for consideration at the
merits phase.97
Issues on immunity. Issues concerning immunity, which are not central to the law of the
sea, are nevertheless in play in some of these cases. For example, in a 2012 shooting incident
at sea during a counter-piracy operation, two Italian marines on board an Italian-flagged
commercial oil tanker, the MV Enrica Lexie, fired on a small fishing boat and killed two Indian
91
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fishermen who were mistaken for pirates. When Indian authorities charged the marines with
murder, Italy claimed that they were entitled to functional immunity (immunity rationae
materiae) for their conduct as members of the Italian armed forces. Thereafter, Italy requested
a provisional measures order from ITLOS, asserting that India had infringed upon the immunity
applicable to the marines. ITLOS prescribed provisional measures, as did an Annex VII arbitral
tribunal established under UNCLOS Annex VII, resulting in a relaxation of bail conditions such
that the two marines were allowed to return to Italy.98 At the merits phase, the arbitral
tribunal was confronted with whether it had jurisdiction to decide a claim concerning such
immunity, given that none of the UNCLOS articles address such immunity (as opposed to
immunity of warships).99 In essence, the tribunal found that the issue of its entitlement to
exercise jurisdiction over the incident could not be satisfactorily answered without first
addressing the question of the immunity of the marines.100 Quoting from the Case Concerning
Certain German Interests before the PCIJ, the tribunal creatively found that the issue of
immunity of the marines “belongs to those ‘questions preliminary or incidental to the
application’ of the Convention.”101
More squarely present in UNCLOS is the immunity of warships.102 In Detention of Three
Ukrainian Naval Vessels, ITLOS found at the provisional measures stage that the rights to
immunity claimed by Ukraine for its three vessels (and their military and security crew) were
plausible.103 At the jurisdictional stage before the Annex VII arbitral tribunal, Russia focused its
arguments on the lack of any immunity for the Ukrainian vessels within the territorial sea. The
Annex VII tribunal, however, decided that the location of the seizure of the vessels was not yet
determined, such that Russia’s objection could only be addressed at the merits stage. 104
VII.

Judicial Settlement

Creativity in UNCLOS dispute resolution procedures is readily apparent in the allowance
for negotiation and mediation, the emphasis on conciliation, and the openness to Annex VII
(and the as-yet unused Annex VIII) arbitration. Yet the creativity arose not just in opening the
door to those modes of dispute resolution, but also in keeping the door open for judicial
98
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settlement, and to do so not just with the existing ICJ, but also through a new international
court, ITLOS.105 Not only have these judicial avenues for dispute resolution been active since
1994, again allowing for a wide range of issues to be resolved pacifically but, as indicated
above, they have set in motion an important interplay or dialogue among arbitral and judicial
bodies, whereby jurisprudence may be creatively developed and strengthened.
A.

Contentious Cases
1.

ITLOS

Creativity in relation to judicial settlement began with the creation of an entirely new
international court in the form of ITLOS, which is based in Hamburg.106 ITLOS consists of
twenty-one judges elected by the UNCLOS States Parties. Each State Party may nominate up to
two candidates, and no two judges may be nationals of the same State. Moreover, to preserve
an equitable geographic distribution, there is an agreed distribution of seats among the
regional groups. Members are elected for nine years and may be re-elected; the terms of one
third of the members expire every three years.107
Though it is common to note the relatively light caseload of ITLOS at any given time, its
presence as an institution available to address matters of urgent concern fills an important void
that previously existed for the law of the sea. Thus, ITLOS may indicate provisional measures of
protection, either for cases filed at ITLOS or for cases filed before an Annex VII tribunal,108 if
ITLOS considers that: (a) prima facie the relevant tribunal would have jurisdiction over the
dispute, (b) “the urgency of the situation so requires,” and (c) the measures are appropriate to
the circumstances to preserve the rights of the parties pending final decision.109 With respect
to (b), although not identified as an express requirement in the Convention, the Tribunal’s
jurisprudence has evolved so as to include an assessment, first, of whether the rights being
advanced by an applicant are at least “plausible,” and then of whether there is urgency in
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protecting those rights.110 If the rights are not plausible, then the extraordinary step of
ordering provisional measures should not be taken to protect the asserted rights. The exact
contours of the concept of “plausibility” of rights is somewhat elusive, but ITLOS and the ICJ
appear to be in a dialogue on this matter; it would seem to require “something more than [a
simple] assertion but less than [full] proof.”111
Moreover, ITLOS has the ability to hear “prompt release” cases so as to address, on an
expedited basis, situations where a coastal State has seized a foreign vessel and crew for
violation of rules relating to its exclusive economic zone, but has failed to promptly release
them, even upon the posting of a reasonable bond.112 A creative feature in this regard is that
natural or juridical persons may appear before ITLOS to seek the prompt release of a vessel and
its crew when detained by a coastal State, though they only do so “on behalf of” the flag State
of the detained vessel (and therefore must first receive authorization from that State). 113
Rather than ITLOS as a whole deciding a contentious matter, a chamber of the tribunal
may instead be convened if desired by the disputing parties.114 Indeed, ITLOS has established
chambers for summary procedure, fisheries disputes, marine environment disputes, and
maritime delimitation disputes in an effort to foster such an approach. Further, there exists a
Seabed Disputes Chamber, which is set up under UNCLOS Part XI and has jurisdiction over
certain disputes concerning the deep seabed.115 Again, there is some creativity in moving away
from exclusively inter-State dispute settlement for seabed disputes. Not only may States
Parties (and State enterprises) appear before the Seabed Disputes Chamber to resolve disputes
relating to Part XI, but so may two entities created by the Convention—the International
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Seabed Authority and the Enterprise116—as well as, in certain circumstances, natural or juridical
persons and prospective contractors who have been sponsored by a State.117
Although twenty-nine cases have been filed at ITLOS as of 2022, they have mostly
related to requests for provisional measures or for prompt release.118 In recent years, however,
ITLOS cases have begun expanding in scope. ITLOS has decided maritime boundaries between
Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal119 and (by means of a chamber) between Ghana
and Côte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean,120 and there is currently pending before an ITLOS
chamber the delimitation of the maritime boundary between Mauritius and Maldives.121
Further, looking at the totality of its jurisprudence, ITLOS may be seen as shaping the law of the
sea in myriad ways. For example, to understand permissible coastal State regulation of vessels
operating on the seas, one might consider not just the text of UNCLOS, but also a series of
ITLOS cases that, collectively, shed light on the matter: the M/V “Norstar” case indicated that
bunkering of leisure vessels on the high seas is part of the freedom of navigation under
Convention article 87;122 the M/V “Virginia G” case maintained that generally the bunkering of
fishing vessels in an exclusive economic zone can be regulated and enforced against by the
coastal State;123 the M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) case explained that, in such a circumstance, the
coastal State cannot apply its customs laws and regulations, though it can do so with respect to
artificial islands, installations, and structures;124 and the Duzgit Integrity case supports the
general proposition that an archipelagic State may regulate and enforce against ship-to-ship oil
transfers in archipelagic waters.125
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The ICJ has been very active in settling law of the sea disputes since 1994, continuing a
role it has played since its inception. Jurisdiction might be established at the ICJ based on
UNCLOS, but to date the Court’s jurisdiction has been invoked in other ways, thereby allowing
the Court at times to decide not just issues arising under the Convention, but other issues was
well, including claims to sovereignty.126 It is to be noted that David Caron was appointed judge
ad hoc of the Court by Colombia in Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces
in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Colombia), a case on which he sat until his passing.127
Keeping the ICJ in play for dispute resolution under UNCLOS was a wise move, as the
Court’s jurisprudence is significantly enriching our understanding of the interpretation and
application of the Convention. For example, the methodology used by courts and tribunals for
many years to delimit maritime areas varied considerably, and UNCLOS did little to clarify
matters. But the ICJ, in its unanimous 2009 Black Sea judgment, indicated that, in cases where
no agreement has been reached by the two States, usually a three-step approach to
delimitation is appropriate. First, the tribunal should establish a provisional equidistance line,
meaning a line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest basepoints of the two
adjacent or opposite States.128 Second, the tribunal should “consider whether there are factors
calling for the adjustment or shifting of the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an
equitable result.”129 Third, the tribunal should “verify that the [delimitation] line … does not …
lead to an inequitable result by reason of any marked disproportion between the ratio of the
respective coastal lengths and the ratio between the relevant maritime area of each State by
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reference to the delimitation line.”130 This approach has now been utilized by Annex VII arbitral
tribunals as well, such as in the Bangladesh v India maritime delimitation case.131
The fact that judicial and arbitral tribunals are in dialogue does not necessarily mean
that they are always in agreement. Indeed, with the proliferation of dispute resolution bodies,
there arises, quite naturally, a concern with fragmentation of international law. Yet some
forms of disagreement can also be a method for creative development of the law, whereby
courts and tribunals refine the relevant rules over time through a process of action and
reaction. An example might be the types of measures that a State may pursue on a provisional
basis in a disputed area of the continental shelf. In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case,
Greece sought a provisional measures order requiring that both Greece and Turkey not engage
in exploration activities in the Aegean Sea, arguing that Turkey’s activities threatened the
exclusivity of Greece’s rights with respect to the extent and location of seabed resources. The
dispute arose before the adoption of UNCLOS and thus the Court did not apply it; rather, it was
applying its own rules and jurisprudence with respect to whether conditions existed meriting
provisional measures of protection by the Court, prior to a judgment on matters of jurisdiction
or the merits. The Court said that provisional measures are only warranted if necessary to
ensure that States do not undertake activities that cause “physical damage to the seabed or
subsoil” (as opposed to exploratory activity such as seismic exploration), do not establish
installations on the continental shelf (as opposed to activities of a “transitory character”), and
do not engage in actual appropriation or other use of natural resources.132
For ITLOS, however, whether such invasive activities are occurring within a disputed
area of the continental shelf appears not to be the automatic touchstone when determining
whether to issue an order on provisional measures of protection. The 2015 Ghana/Côte
d’Ivoire Special Chamber’s order on provisional measures accepted that drilling causes a
“significant and permanent modification of the physical character of the area in dispute and …
such modification cannot be fully compensated by financial reparations.”133 Yet the Chamber
declined to order Ghana to suspend existing oil exploration and exploitation activities in the
disputed maritime area.134 Rather, it allowed exploitation of shelf resources to continue even
within the disputed area, because suspending such activities would cause prejudice to Ghana
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(Ghana had been engaged in such exploitation before Côte d'Ivoire claimed that the area was
part of its continental shelf) and could cause harm to the marine environment.135
Conversely, the Chamber found that some non-invasive activities may also merit
provisional measures of protection. Thus, the Chamber found that acquisition and subsequent
use of geological information concerning the disputed area created a risk of irreversible
prejudice.136 Ultimately, the Special Chamber ordered: (a) Ghana to “take all necessary steps
to ensure that no new drilling either by Ghana or [by others] under its control take place in the
disputed area”; (b) Ghana to “take all necessary steps to prevent information resulting from
past, ongoing or future exploration activities conducted by Ghana, or with its authorization, in
the disputed area that is not already in the public domain from being used in any way
whatsoever to the detriment of Côte d’Ivoire”; (c) Ghana to “carry out strict and continuous
monitoring of all activities undertaken by Ghana or with its authorization in the disputed area,
with a view to ensuring the prevention of serious harm to the marine environment”; (d) both
parties to “take all necessary steps [in the disputed area] to prevent serious harm to the marine
environment, including the continental shelf and in its superjacent waters,” and to “cooperate
toward that end”; and (e) both parties to “pursue cooperation and refrain from any unilateral
action that might lead to aggravating the dispute.”137 This approach reflects a creative
development of the law in this area that begins with but goes well beyond the approach taken
by the Court in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case. In due course, it may help inform the
Court’s approach to such issues.
B.

Advisory Opinions

Advisory opinions issued either by the ICJ or by ITLOS can also feature in dispute
settlement under the law of the sea, and here too creativity may be observed. In addition to
resolving contentious disputes, a chamber of ITLOS—known as the Seabed Disputes Chamber—
has express authority to “give advisory opinions at the request of the Assembly or the Council
on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.”138 In response to certain
questions posed by the Council, the Chamber issued its first advisory opinion in 2011 entitled
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to
Activities in the Area.139 Among other things, the Chamber clarified that a State that sponsors
contractors who engage in activities on the deep seabed is responsible for supervising them,
including any drilling, dredging, or excavation. Further, States must engage in a precautionary
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approach with respect to such activities, must use best environmental practices, and must
conduct environmental impact assessments.
In contrast with the Seabed Disputes Chamber, UNCLOS does not provide any express
authority to ITLOS as a whole to issue advisory opinions. Even so, in 2013, the Sub-Regional
Fisheries Commission, which is a fisheries commission comprising seven West African
nations,140 requested an advisory opinion from ITLOS. The Commission asked ITLOS four
questions about the rights and obligations of flag and coastal States regarding fishing in the
exclusive economic zone, such as to what extent a flag State may be held liable for illegal fishing
activities conducted by vessels sailing under its flag.141 Twenty-two UNCLOS States Parties filed
written statements with ITLOS on these questions, as did the Commission and six other
international organizations.142 An oral hearing was held in 2014, at which ten States Parties
appeared, as well as the Commission and two other international organizations,143 thereby
allowing a robust exchange of views on the issues at hand.
ITLOS’s jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions was contested; many States Parties
argued that it had no power to do so. Nevertheless, in 2015 ITLOS found that it is capable of
providing advisory opinions,144 hence opening the door to potentially wide-ranging guidance on
the interpretation and application of UNCLOS, including on matters that are less susceptible to
resolution through contentious cases. ITLOS then went on to provide a broad analysis of the
obligations of flag States with respect to sustainable fisheries management, which one hopes
will guide those States when regulating their flag vessels in another State’s exclusive economic
zone, not just off the coast of West Africa but worldwide.145
VIII.

Commission on the Continental Shelf

UNCLOS also establishes a Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS),
which consists of twenty-one members who are “experts in the field of geology, geophysics or
hydrography, elected by States Parties to this Convention from among their nationals, having
due regard to the need to ensure equitable geographical representation, who shall serve in
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their personal capacities.”146 Strictly speaking, the CLCS is not a dispute resolution body.
Having said that, it receives submissions from coastal States about their claims to continental
shelves extending beyond 200 nautical miles and, after receiving comments from other States,
it issues recommendations to the coastal State. If the coastal State establishes the limits to its
extended continental shelf in a manner that takes into account these recommendations, then
those limits shall be final and binding.147 Thus, the CLCS is a new institutional mechanism that
in the long-term may be important in reducing disputes among States regarding the
permissibility of extended continental shelves. As of August 2022, the CLCS has received
ninety-two submissions from States and has issued about thirty-five recommendations, some
with respect to the same submission.148
One interesting issue is the interplay of applications to/recommendations by the CLCS
and dispute resolution before other fora on delimitation of the outer continental shelf (OCS,
meaning the shelf beyond 200 nautical miles). One particular question is whether an
international court or tribunal should exercise jurisdiction to delimit the OCS between States
with opposite or adjacent coasts if the CLCS has not yet made recommendations as to the
existence of those States’ respective shelves. The two processes—a CLCS recommendation as
to whether/where a State may claim an OCS and an international tribunal’s delimitation of the
overlapping OCS of two States—are clearly distinct, the former being governed by UNCLOS
Article 76 and the latter by UNCLOS Article 83.149 Even so, it has been argued that until a coastal
State actually demonstrates the existence of its claimed OCS by means of the CLCS process, an
international court or tribunal should not delimit such a claim vis-à-vis another State. That
argument presents a “chicken-and-the egg situation,” however, in that the CLCS by its rules will
not proceed with issuance of a recommendation in situations where there is a dispute over the
delimitation of the relevant OCS, unless the States concerned so consent.150 The CLCS is also
slow in issuing recommendations and has a considerable backlog of submissions awaiting its
examination.
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Consequently, so as to avoid an impasse, international courts and tribunals have
gingerly but creatively proceeded with such OCS delimitations. In Bangladesh/Myanmar, both
States had made submissions to the CLCS, but had not given consent for the CLCS to issue
recommendations on each other’s claims. Even so, ITLOS concluded that it had an obligation to
delimit the overlapping area of the two OCS claims and proceeded to do so, albeit “without
prejudice” to the subsequent establishment of each State’s OCS.151 Interestingly, the apparent
existence of a OCS for both States based on uncontested scientific evidence influenced the
Tribunal; it said that it “would have been hesitant to proceed with the delimitation of the area
beyond 200 nm had it concluded that there was significant uncertainty as to the existence of a
continental margin in the area in question.”152 In Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire, the two States had
consented to CLCS examination of each other’s submissions, despite overlapping claims, and
Ghana had received affirmative recommendations, but no CLCS recommendation had yet been
reached on Côte d’Ivoire’s submission. Again, ITLOS (by special chamber) proceeded to delimit
the overlapping OCS and, once again, did so based on there being “no doubt” that an OCS
existed for Côte d’Ivoire.153
In Somalia v Kenya, the two States had made submissions to the CLCS, neither had
received recommendations, and neither questioned that the other had an OCS. Even so,
whether one or both States actually possessed an OCS was much less clear than in
Bangladesh/Myanmar or in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire. The International Court of Justice itself
recognized this by noting that its adjusted equidistance line entailed the “possibility” of a “grey
area” (an area where Kenya might possess sovereign rights to an OCS while Somalia possessed
sovereign rights to the exclusive economic zone).154 Yet, despite this uncertainty, the Court
proceeded to delimit the area of the OCS as between the two States, a step that elicited
concerns from some of the judges.155
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The existence of numerous inter-State maritime disputes today is self-evident, and they
no doubt will continue in the years to come. While delimitation disputes obviously come to
mind, many other sources of friction might also be mentioned: the resurgence of piracy,
recurrent military incidents on the seas, the recovery of cultural or historical objects at sea,
access to maritime genetic resources, disputes over islands, and the vexing issue of maritime
smuggling of persons.156 One issue likely to spawn future disputes relates to global climate
change, which is causing a rise in sea levels due to the expansion of ocean water and the
melting of glaciers and polar ice. That rise in sea levels is causing shifts in coastlines, with the
potential for greater uncertainty in the location of baselines and of the seaward maritime
zones. As David Caron well-observed, current law here may be misguided, as it calls for
ambulatory baselines, rather than allowing States to “freeze” their baselines and maritime
zones in place, thereby protecting their rights to maritime spaces.157
To resolve such disputes, the creativity of the drafters of UNCLOS will no doubt be put
to good use; the Convention’s substantive rules will be central, but the robust and varied
dispute resolution procedures created by and available to States will also be important. Some
creativity may be merited and essential when addressing vague, ambiguous or undefined
terms, or when applying even clear rules and procedures by dispute settlers to unique
circumstances that the UNCLOS drafters did not envisage. Yet it is important to keep in mind
that, as creative a lawyer as David Caron was, he also worried about the potential overreach of
dispute settlers,158 and in particular that their creativity in resolving a problem might extend
beyond the settled law and jurisdiction accorded to them by States. Given the importance of a
transparent and well-grounded system of rules for inducing compliance by States and others,
creativity in deciding cases relating to the law of the sea may be beneficial in measured doses,
but it is perilous if unbounded.
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